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COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL 
LAW:  A CALL FOR FREE AND FAIR 
ELECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
frica has an extensive history of ethnic conflict.1  During 
the colonial era, many ethnic groups in Africa were arbi-
trarily joined together in an effort to form territorial units with 
little regard for the pre-existing boundaries.2  Following inde-
pendence, many African countries retained the boundaries that 
were established by colonial powers.3  The ethnic conflict that 
ensued has inevitably been reflected in the political processes 
and has largely prevented these countries from experiencing 
the stability necessary to establish a true democracy.4   
An emerging right to democratic governance has been recog-
nized by the international community.5  This right is based on 
the theory that governments derive their powers from the con-
sent of the governed.6  This requires an electoral process charac-
terized by public participation.7  Thus, an important manifesta-
tion of this right is holding free and fair elections.  Because 
“representative democracy is an indispensable condition for 
  
 1. Okechukwu Oko, Partition or Perish: Restoring Social Equilibrium in 
Nigeria through Reconfiguration, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 319 (1998) 
[hereinafter Oko, Partition or Perish].  Chinedi Reginald Ezetah, Minority 
Rights: International Law of Self-Determination and the Ogoni Question: Mir-
roring Africa’s Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 811, 
812 (1997). 
 2. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 124 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 
et al. eds., 2002). 
 3. The preservation of colonial borders was the result of uti possedetis.  
According to this principle, borders drawn under the colonial regime that cor-
responded to a colonial entity were preserved when the colonies achieved in-
dependence.  Id. at 124. 
 4. See Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 318–19.  See also Linda 
Maguire, Power Ethnicized, 2 BUFF. JOUR. INT’L  L. 49 (1995) (discussing how 
the policies of the colonial powers contributed to ethnic divisions in African 
colonies, especially in Rwanda and Burundi).  
 5. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 
AMER. J. INT’L L. 46, 46–47 (1992).  
 6. Id. at 46. 
 7. Id. at 63. 
A 
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[the] stability, peace and development,”8 elections are especially 
important in countries that have historically been plagued by 
ethnic conflict and are emerging from transitional periods.  
While many African states have established democratic gov-
ernments through elections, the political environments in which 
these elections are held have generally been regarded with sus-
picion.  Indeed, many elections are marred by reports of threats, 
intimidation, harassment and violence.9  The hostile political 
environment in which many African elections are held naturally 
raises questions about the “fairness” of these elections.  Instead 
of democratic governments, citizens have been subjected to op-
pressive regimes, which justify their political repression as 
based on a need to combat the security threats that ethnic con-
flicts pose.  
Although these countries have taken substantial steps to-
wards establishing a democratic government, this Note argues 
that there are international and domestic obligations to hold 
free and fair elections that have not been fulfilled.  As an exam-
ple, this Note will examine elections in Nigeria and Rwanda, 
two African states emerging from a transitional period.  Part II 
will provide an overview of the political history in these two 
states.  Part III will discuss the sources of the obligations to 
hold free and fair elections.  Part IV will discuss the failure of 
these two countries to fulfill their obligations by examining the 
  
 8. O.A.S. Charter, pmbl., available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/ 
agres1080.htm. 
 9. See Ellen Knickmeyer, Security Forces Move Out in Force to Quell 
Challenges to Africa’s Longest-reigning Ruler, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3, 2003 
(For example, President Eyadema of Togo, a West African country, has been 
in power since 1963. Although Togo holds elections, President Eyadema has 
routinely used force to quash any opponents.  Following the 1998 presidential 
elections when Eyadema abruptly stopped the vote count and declared himself 
the winner, international donors discontinued almost all funds to Togo.).  See 
also INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ZIMBABWE: ANOTHER ELECTION CHANCE, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), at http://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
home/index.cfm?id=3142&l=1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (summarizing the 
problems with the political environment in Zimbabwe leading up to the March 
2005 elections including how President Mugabe has “used economic bribery, 
bullying and propaganda to increase his support and remain in power.”).   See 
also Franck, supra note 5, at 50 (The results of the 1988 national elections in 
Senegal were widely regarded as fraudulent by both opposition parties and 
social institutions.  As a result, the opposition parties boycotted the 1990 local 
elections.).  
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repressive atmosphere in which the recent elections took place, 
the constitutional violations that resulted, and the inadequacy 
of the mechanisms designed to ensure free and fair elections.  
This Note will conclude in Part V that, in addition to fulfilling 
international and domestic obligations, free and fair elections 
are extremely important in countries plagued by ethnic conflict 
and emerging from a transitional period because they provide 
legitimacy both internationally and domestically.  
II. POLITICAL HISTORY 
A. Nigeria 
During the colonial era, many of the different ethnic groups 
in Nigeria were forced into one “nation-state.”10  In Nigeria, 
there are approximately 250 ethnic groups.11  There are three 
main ethnic groups: the Hausas in the North, the Yorubas in 
the West and the Ibos in the East.12  Within these main ethnic 
groups are many smaller groups.13  The British disregarded the 
fact that many of these ethnic groups existed as separate tribal 
communities with their own languages, religion and culture.14  
Despite this forced unification of different ethnicities, the colo-
nial policies utilized by the British actually encouraged ethnic 
divisions and set the stage for ensuing ethnic distrust.15  Be-
cause Britain did not treat Nigeria as a single nation, its citi-
  
 10. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 327–28. 
 11. Ezetah, supra note 1, at 813.    
 12. Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes 
Towards a More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 
102–03 (2003) [hereinafter Oko, Confronting Transgressions].  
 13. Id. at 103. 
 14. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 327. 
 15. See id. at 330–31.  In response to Britain’s disregard of customary val-
ues and tradition, many citizens found solace in their ethnic groups.  This had 
the effect of strengthening their ties to their ethnic groups and promoting 
loyalty to the different ethnic groups rather than to the state as a whole.  In 
1900, Britain adopted a policy of ruling the North and South as two separate 
entities and, in 1914, Southern Nigeria was divided into eastern and western 
regions.  Because each region was compromised of different ethnic groups, 
British policy created a breeding ground for ethnic distrust among the differ-
ent regions.  Id. 
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zens did not consider themselves part of one nation and, thus, 
limited their concerns to their own ethnic groups.16  
1. Post-Independence 
When Nigeria achieved independence in 1960,17 it had an op-
portunity to establish an appropriate government for its multi-
ethnic society.  The government that was established, however, 
consisted of a parliamentary democracy in which political lead-
ers tended to represent their respective ethnic groups.18  The 
ethnic distrust formed during the colonial era contributed to 
this post-independence political environment of ethnic self-
interest in which the nation’s welfare as a whole was rarely the 
focus of political campaigns.19  In this political environment, it 
was no wonder that the first post-independence elections in the 
republic of Nigeria proved useless as politicians “brutally dis-
played their lack of respect for democracy.”20 
2. Military Rule 
Nigeria’s transition to democracy was undermined by the cor-
ruption that had infused the political process.  The solution to 
Nigeria’s degeneration into anarchy came in the form of a mili-
tary government.21  In 1966, a military intervention was 
claimed necessary in order to avoid the country’s demise.22  Fol-
lowing an unsuccessful coup in which the federal prime minis-
ter and finance minister were murdered,23 General Ironsi, who 
was in command of the Nigerian army, took over administration 
of the country at the request of the remaining members the 
government.24  The military regime promptly promulgated the 
  
 16. See id. at 331–32. 
 17. THE CARTER CENTER AND NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFF., 
OBSERVING THE 1998–1999 NIGERIA ELECTIONS, FINAL REPORT 13 (1999) [here-
inafter CARTER CENTER REPORT], at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/ 
1152.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
 18. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 331–33. 
 19. Id. at 332. 
 20. Id. at 333. 
 21. Id. at 333–34. 
 22. Elizabeth Knight, Facing the Past: Retrospective Justice as a Means to 
Promote Democracy in Nigeria, 35 CONN. L. REV. 867, 872 (2003). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 334. 
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Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree. 25  This de-
cree gave the military government the power to “make laws for 
the peace, order and good government.”26  Under the pretense of 
promoting national unity, the decree suspended the Constitu-
tion and left the military regime free to “embark upon whole-
sale destruction of the democratic process.”27  The military re-
gime attempted to ensure compliance with its rule by quashing 
dissenters and undermining the entire system of government.28  
The military, however, was not immune from the ethnic divi-
sions that plagued the country as a whole and nearly six 
months later, the army split off into ethnic groups.29  
The next military regime, headed by Colonel Gowon, was 
again the product of a coup in 1966.30  This time, like the last, 
the justification for military intervention was a need to avoid 
the disintegration of the country.31  In response to growing eth-
nic tensions between the east and north regions, Colonel Gowon 
divided all four regions into twelve different states.32  The re-
sult, however, was a polarization of ethnic groups in newly cre-
ated territorial divisions in which some states consisted of a 
single ethnic group.33  A thirty-month civil war ensued after the 
eastern region threatened secession, but Colonel Gowon man-
aged to crush the opposition in order to “maintain the territorial 
integrity” of the nation and to “assert the ability of the black 
man to build a strong progressive and prosperous modern 
state.”34  In spite of Colonel Gowon’s promise that there would 
  
 25. See Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Conti-
nent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 573, 591 
(2000).  
 26. Id. at 591 n.83. 
 27. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 334.  In 1966, General Ironsi 
promulgated the Unification Decree abolishing all regional governments.  He 
justified his radical action on the grounds that the Decree would rid the coun-
try of all traces of regionalism thereby promoting the cohesion necessary for a 
successful government.  Id. 
 28. Knight, supra note 22, at 872. 
 29. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 335. 
 30. Id. at 336. 
 31. Knight, supra note 22, at 873. 
 32. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 335. 
 33. Id. (For example, the East Central State, part of the former eastern 
region, was comprised solely of Ibos). 
 34. Id. at 335–36 (Colonel Ojukwu, the former governor of the eastern re-
gion, declared the former eastern region the Republic of Biafra).  This was not 
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be a restoration of democracy following his transitional period 
of military rule, by the end of his reign democracy still had not 
been restored.35  
3. Return to Civilian Government 
The military regime headed by Colonel Olusegen Obasanjo 
appeared to fare better in keeping its promise to restore democ-
racy.  A Constitution Drafting Committee, composed of fifty 
members from various states and professions, was created.36  In 
an effort to address the concerns of the country’s multi-ethnic 
communities, specific provisions were included to discourage 
ethnic conflict.37  Most importantly, the new constitution estab-
lished a presidential system of government,38 finally fulfilling 
the military’s promise of a restoration to democracy.  
Once the Constitution was promulgated into law on October 
1, 1979,39 a Federal Electoral Commission (Commission) was 
established.40  The Commission was responsible for organizing 
elections and regulating the activities of political parties.41  One 
of the main objectives of the Commission was to ensure that all 
political associations were open to every citizen, regardless of 
their ethnicity, and that each association truly reflected the 
multi-ethnic character of the country.42  When the military lifted 
  
the last time Nigeria would be faced with a threat of secession.  In October 
1990, the Ogoni, an ethnic minority group located in the south of the country, 
presented its demand for self-determination to the military government of 
General Babangida.  Ezetah, supra note 1, at 817–20.  The Ogoni’s demands 
were met with violent oppression.  Id.   
 35. Colonel Gowon’s reign ended in a coup in 1975.  His successor was 
General Mohammed, a cabinet minister under Colonel Gowon.  See Oko, Par-
tition or Perish, supra note 1, at 338.   
 36. Id. at 337. 
 37. For example, the Constitution prohibited discrimination on the 
grounds of ethnic association, encouraged intermarriage among persons from 
different ethnic groups and promoted the formation of associations that cut 
across ethnic barriers.  NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1979) § 15(2)–(3)(c)–(d). 
 38. See id. § 30–42.  See also Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 338. 
 39. See Const. (Enactment) Decree No. 25 (1978) (Nig.).   
 40. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979)  
§ 140(1)(c).    
 41. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 339. 
 42. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979)  
§ 202(b), (e). 
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the ban on political parties, however, many of the same politi-
cians from the first post-independence political scene returned,43  
which set the stage for the elections of 1979. 
4. Elections 
Election monitors claimed the elections of 1979 were “tolera-
bly free and fair.”44  This appeared to restore some faith in the 
democratic system, as there was no military intervention.  
When President Shehu Shagari was re-elected in 1983, how-
ever, it became apparent that there had been widespread vote-
rigging and that the election had been a fraud.45  Not surpris-
ingly, the military intervened again and ousted President 
Shehu Shagari, this time claiming the need to “redress the na-
tion’s social and economic problems.”46  Presidential elections 
were held again in 1993, and Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba busi-
nessman, was the apparent winner.47  General Babangida, how-
ever, nullified the elections on the eve of the election results.48  
Many suspected the General of nullifying the election because 
Abiola was perceived as a threat to the northern tribes that 
traditionally dominated Nigerian politics.49  
  
 43. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 340.  Ultimately, the Com-
mission approved five political parties: Great Nigeria’s People Party (GNPP); 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN); Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP); Peoples Re-
demption Party (PRP) and Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN).  Id. at 339. 
 44. Nigeria’s History of Turmoil, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, (N.D.) [hereinaf-
ter Nigeria’s History of Turmoil], at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/timeline.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).  Shehu 
Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was elected in October 1979.  
Id. 
 45. RICHARD A. JOSEPH, NIGERIA:  THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SECOND 
REPUBLIC 170–73 (1987). 
 46. Knight, supra note 22, at 872. 
 47. Frank Aigbogun, General Takes Control of Nigeria, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 
18, 1993, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/ 
nigeria/stories/general111893.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).  
 48. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.  Both local and interna-
tional election observers regarded the 1993 elections as “free and fair.”  UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Irin Web Special On Ni-
geria, IRINNEWS.ORG (N.D.) [hereinafter Irin Web Special On Nigeria], at 
http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/nigeria/defaut.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 
2005).   
 49. Aigbogun, supra note 47.  When Abiola declared himself President in 
1994 he was arrested and charged with treason.  Abiola eventually died in 
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Following the annulled election, General Babangida stepped 
down and established a civilian government that was promptly 
taken over by General Abacha.50  Despite the military govern-
ment’s promise of a transition to democracy, the subsequent 
elections held in 1998 proved to be a ploy to preserve the mili-
tary’s power.51  Only five parties were permitted to participate 
in the elections and all nominated General Abacha.52  The elec-
tions were an effort to bolster the military’s image, whose popu-
larity was at an all-time low, both domestically and abroad, by 
implementing political reforms in response to the international 
community’s growing concern about the government’s brutal 
political repression.53  The international community, however, 
denounced the elections and many Nigerian citizens voiced op-
position to the present government through demonstrations, 
riots and increasing acts of violence.54   
When General Abacha suddenly died, his successor, General 
Abubakar, promptly stepped in and attempted to improve the 
image of the government.55  It appeared that the transition to 
democracy would take place and, in 1998, Abubakar agreed that 
elections would be held by early 1999.56  To facilitate this proc-
ess, he established an Independent National Electoral Commis-
sion (INEC) in 1998 to organize and supervise the electoral 
process.57  
  
prison in 1998.  Nigeria’s History of Turmoil, supra note 44.  His wife, Kudirat 
Abiola, was shot to death in 1996.  Id. 
 50. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.  
 51. Id. at 14.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  In response to the military government’s harassment and detention 
of political dissidents, including journalists, human rights activists and politi-
cians, the international community restricted aid and relations with Nigeria.  
Id.  In particular, the United States and the European Union recalled their 
ambassadors and the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution in December 
1995 condemning the executions.  Ezetah, supra note 1, at 822–23. 
 54. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that there were 
also frequent anti-government bombings).   
 55. Id. at 14 (General Abacha reportedly died of a heart attack). 
 56. Nigeria’s History of Turmoil, supra note 44. 
 57. See Const. (Independent National Electoral Commission Decree) De-
cree No. 17 § 4(1)(a) (1998) (Nig.).  A former justice, Ephraim Akpata, was 
appointed chair of the commission.  CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 
16. 
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The INEC is authorized to exercise considerable discretion in 
the performance of its duties to organize, conduct and supervise 
all elections.58  Its duties include conducting voter registration, 
compiling authentic voter registers and monitoring political 
parties.59  In order to perform its duties, the INEC may estab-
lish rules and regulations to govern the operation of the parties 
as well as their campaigns.60  In addition, the INEC is author-
ized to issue guidelines to govern the election process.61 
For the 1998-99 elections, former U.S. President Jimmy 
Carter initiated a mission to observe the elections.62  Although 
international election monitors agreed that the elections were 
an important step in the democratization process, they noted 
many “electoral irregularities.”63  In an ironic twist, former mili-
tary ruler, Olusegen Obasanjo was confirmed the winner.64  It 
was alleged that the election was influenced by northern mili-
tary political power when the Muslim Hausa in northern Nige-
ria dominated the military and exerted its power to keep a 
Christian Yoruba from becoming President for fear that gov-
ernment funds would be diverted away from the North.65  In 
spite of the allegations of bribery and recognition of election 
process deficiencies, the election was nevertheless hailed as an 
important step in the democratic process.66 
  
 58. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) 3rd 
sched., § 15(a). 
 59. Id. § 15(e)–(f). 
 60. Id. § 15(c), (f). 
 61. See Const. (Independent National Electoral Commission Decree) De-
cree No. 17  § 4 (1998) (Nig.).   
 62. See generally CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17.  (Local elections 
were held on Dec. 5, 1998; State and Governor elections were held on Jan. 9, 
1999; National Assembly elections on Feb. 10, 1999 and the National elections 
on Feb. 27, 1999.). 
 63. Id. at 32 (noting that the reported voter turnout greatly exceeded voter 
registration). 
 64. Irin Web Special on Nigeria, supra note 48.  Obasanjo was the military 
ruler who handed over the government to civilian rule in 1979.  Id.  Obasanjo 
was jailed by General Abacha for allegedly plotting to overthrow the govern-
ment.  Id.  He was released just months before the election.  Id.      
 65. Knight, supra note 22, at 886.  Although President Obasanjo is of 
Yoruba descent, it was alleged that he “had the support of the military and 
was controlled by powerful northern political interests.”  Id. 
 66. Id.  
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B. Rwanda 
1. Colonial History 
When Rwanda was colonized by Germany in the late nine-
teenth century,67 it was inhabited by three ethnic groups: Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa.68  The Tutsi migrated to Rwanda in the four-
teenth century, which was already inhabited by the Hutu and 
Twa.69  Although the Tutsi were greatly outnumbered by Hutus, 
it became the dominant group.70  Rwanda was a monarchy and 
the Tutsi kings ruled from the 1600s forward.71  Despite the po-
litical dominance of the Tutsi, the Hutu and Tutsi lived in rela-
tive peace before colonization.72   
After Germany’s defeat in World War I, Rwanda was ceded to 
Belgium.73  Like Germany, Belgium administered a colonial pol-
icy of indirect rule.74  Unlike Germany, however, Belgium arbi-
trarily determined who the rulers of Rwanda would be and re-
placed all Hutu leaders with Tutsis.75  In addition, the Tutsi 
  
 67. Maguire, supra note 4, at 55.  In the late 1800s, there were many Ger-
man-led expeditions into the region that would become known as Ruandi-
Urundi, now known as the countries Rwanda and Burundi.  Id.  By 1899, 
Germany exercised “de facto control” over the area through the establishment 
of various military outposts and Rwanda became part of German East Africa.  
Id. 
 68. Dorinda Lee Peacock, Comment, It Happened and It Can Happen 
Again: The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 899, 911 (1997). The Twa were the original inhabitants of the 
region, the Hutu were agriculturalists and the Tutsi were pastoralists.  Id.  
 69. BBC News, Timeline: Rwanda (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Rwanda 
Timeline], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1070329. 
stm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
 70. Peacock, supra note 68, at 911. 
 71. Rwanda Timeline, supra note 69. 
 72. Maguire, supra note 4, at 61.  The relationship between the Hutu and 
Tutsi strongly resembled the European feudal system.  Id.  The Hutu were 
agriculturists and harvested crops on parcels of land and paid the Tutsi to 
protect them.  Id.  Although the social system was based on inequality, each 
ethnic group relied on the other, thus, neither group resorted to violence 
against the other.  Id. 
 73. Id. at 55. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.   
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also enjoyed economic and educational advancement.76  The ba-
sis of Belgium’s policy was the alleged superiority of the Tutsi, 
who most resembled Europeans as they were taller and had 
lighter complexions than the Hutu.77  As a result of Belgium’s 
policy of preferential treatment, Hutus were systematically ex-
cluded from participating in the political, educational and judi-
cial spheres of society.78 
When Rwanda was deemed a UN trust territory in 1946, Bel-
gium became responsible for promoting Rwanda’s transition 
towards independence.79  Belgium’s policy towards its colonial 
inhabitants, however, took a different approach.  Instead of ex-
hibiting clear preferential treatment towards the Tutsi, the 
Belgians began to promote and incite the existing atmosphere of 
ethnic and political tension.80  Although the Belgians imple-
mented constitutional reforms designed to give the Hutu 
greater representation in government, the Tutsi retained their 
control over government positions.81  Despite the Hutus demand 
for representation proportionate to their numbers, the Tutsi 
were, naturally, reluctant to relinquish control.82  Finally, as a 
result of Hutu discontent and Belgium encouragement, the 
Hutu began to rebel against the politically dominant Tutsi.83 
In 1959, Hutu discontent manifested itself in a violent upris-
ing that resulted in thousands of deaths.84  Thousands of Tutsis 
fled to Uganda, including Tutsi King Kigeri V.85  The result of 
  
 76. BBC News, Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened (June 7, 2001) [here-
inafter Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
world/africa/1288230.stm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
 77. Maguire, supra note 4, at 55, 62–64.  See also Rwanda: How the Geno-
cide Happened, supra note 76 (discussing the basis for the Belgians’ preferen-
tial treatment of the Tutsi). 
 78. Maguire, supra note 4, at 55. 
 79. Id. at 56. 
 80. Id. at 56–57. 
 81. Id. at 57.  During this period of transition, the Tutsi held all forty-three 
of the chiefdoms, 549 sub-chief positions (out of 559) and approximately 
eighty-two percent of judicial and agricultural positions.  Id.   
 82. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE POST REPORT, RWANDA [here-
inafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE RWANDA REPORT], at http://foia.state.gov/MMS/ 
postrpt/pr_view_all.asp?CntryID=125 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 76 (estimating that 
more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed).   
 85. Rwanda Timeline, supra note 69.  
File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc Created on:  6/8/2005 1:42 PM Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM 
1040 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:3 
 
the “Rwandan Revolution,” which was primarily led by the 
Hutu-dominated political party, Parti du Mouvement de 
l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), was the abolition of the 
monarchy and the establishment of a republic.86  Thus, when 
Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutus were in power 
of the newly formed, independent Republic of Rwanda.87  
2. Post-Independence 
In the years following independence, the Hutu maintained 
their political power by systematically discriminating against 
the Tutsi.88  Under the repressive Hutu regime, Tutsis were pe-
riodically subjected to waves of killing and ethnic cleansing.89  
In Uganda, Rwandan refugees, mostly comprised of Tutsi whose 
return had been continually prevented by the Hutu govern-
ment, formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF).90  In 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda and the civil war 
that ensued lasted for three years with a death toll in the thou-
sands.91  In an effort to end the civil war, the Organization for 
African Unity (OAU) mediated a peace agreement,92 the Arusha 
Peace Accords, between the Rwandan government, headed by 
President Habyarimana, and the RPF in 1993.93  
  
 86. Maguire, supra note 4, at 57. 
 87. Rwanda Timeline, supra note 69 (Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, became 
president of independent Rwanda).   
 88. Samantha Powers, Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Sept. 2001, available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/power.htm (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2005).  
 89. Id.  The situation was quite the opposite, however, in Burundi, 
Rwanda’s neighboring country.  Maguire, supra note 4, at 58.  From 1966–
1983, Tutsi ruled Burundi and the Hutu were subject to persecution and peri-
odic killing.  Id.  
 90. L. Danielle Tully, Note, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaa 
Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 388 (2003). 
 91. Maguire, supra note 4, at 57.  During the civil war of the 1990s France 
provided the Hutu regime with military support.  See generally PHILIP 
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED 
WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998) (discussing French action in Rwanda).  
 92. S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg. ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/872 (1993). 
 93. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Aug. 4, 1993 [hereinafter Arusha 
Peace Accords].  
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Under the Arusha Peace Accords, there was to be power shar-
ing among the Rwandan government, the RPF and other newly-
formed political parties under a transitional government that 
would govern until democratic elections were held.94  The 
United Nations established a neutral force, the U.N. Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), to assist in the implementation 
of the peace agreement and to supervise the establishment of a 
new government and elections by December 1995.95  Hutu ex-
tremists, however, refused to accept the terms of the peace 
agreement and initiated a plan of terror against Tutsis and 
Hutu moderates who supported the agreement.96 
3. Genocide 
In April 1994, the fragile state of security in Rwanda was de-
stroyed literally overnight when President Habyarimana and 
President Ntaryamira of Burundi, who were returning from a 
peace conference, were killed when their plane was shot down.97  
Within hours of President Habyarimana’s death, the Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR) and Hutu militia groups98 embarked on a 
systematic killing spree targeting Tutsis, politically moderate 
Hutus who supported the peace agreement, peacekeepers and 
human rights activists.99  Although the 1994 genocide was the 
result of a carefully planned attack organized by the Rwandan 
Presidential Guard, who reportedly prepared lists of targets in 
advance, the violence soon spread and the civilian population, 
  
 94. Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a 
Broad-Based Transitional Government Between the Government of the Re-
public of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Oct. 30, 1992, arts. 14, 
23(1) [hereinafter Arusha Protocol].  
 95. S.C. Res. 872, supra note 92, ¶¶ 2–3, 6.  
 96. Powers, supra note 88. 
 97. Frontline: The Triumph of Evil: 100 Days of Slaughter: A Chronology of 
U.S./U.N. Actions (1999), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
evil/etc/slaughter.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
 98. Tully, supra note 90, at 388.  The Interahamwe, “Those Who Attack 
Together,” and the Impuzaamugambi, “Those With a Single Purpose,” were 
trained by extremist Hutus in Rwanda to help carry out the genocide.  Id. 
 99. Powers, supra note 88 (among the first victims was Prime Minister 
Agathe Uwilingiyimana who became head of state after President Habyari-
mana’s death).   
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encouraged by Hutu-controlled radio stations,100 also took part 
in the attacks.101 By July 1994, however, the RPF had defeated 
Hutu extremists and established a new government, the Gov-
ernment of National Unity, thus bringing the genocide to an 
end.102 
4. Post-Genocide 
Following the genocide, Rwanda entered a period of recon-
struction.  Former President Habyarimana’s political party, the 
Mouvement Republicain Nacionale pour la Democratie 
(MRND), was outlawed103 and new mechanisms were created to 
prosecute those responsible for genocidal acts.104  To demon-
strate its commitment to establishing a multi-ethnic govern-
ment under the Arusha peace agreement, the new government 
chose Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, to be President and a major-
ity of cabinet posts were assigned to members of the Tutsi-
dominated RPF.105  In spite of this action, however, the new gov-
ernment was clearly Tutsi-dominated.  
  
 100. See Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International 
Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 628 (1997).  Radio-Television Libre 
des Milles Collines (RTLM) was a semi-private station founded by Hutu ex-
tremists that would broadcast propaganda against Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus.  Id. at 631.  The broadcasts were designed to incite attacks against 
individuals who were identified and criticized on the air.  Id.  During the 
genocide, RTLM broadcast the names of targets as well as the license plate 
numbers of specific vehicles said to contain “accomplices.”  Id. 
 101. Peacock, supra note 68, at 916.  It is estimated that approximately 
500,000 Tutsis were killed as a result of the 1994 genocide.  HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH WORLD REPORT 2003: RWANDA [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS RWANDA 
REPORT], at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa9.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
 102. Tully, supra note 90, at 389.  Following the RPF’s victory, an estimated 
two million Hutus fled the country. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, 
supra note 76. 
 103. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RWANDA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1995, Mar. 
1996, at http://www.state.gov/r/pae/ei/bgn/2861.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2005). 
 104. Organic Law 8/96, arts. 19–23 (1996) (Rwanda), available at 
http://preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2005) (The Rwandan government created special chambers within the existing 
courts to deal exclusively with genocide cases.  In addition, four categories 
were established to separate criminals with different degrees of responsibil-
ity.).  
 105. Peacock, supra note 68, at 918.  
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The RPF’s political philosophy consisted of the notion that a 
“true democracy” could only be achieved through public partici-
pation in public affairs and the eradication of ethnicity.106 Be-
cause ethnic discrimination was used to legitimize political 
power, the RPF ideology aimed to eliminate ethnicity from the 
political arena.107  The Rwandan government implemented po-
litical policies designed to control the actions of political parties 
that were justified by the need to ensure that the opposition did 
not foster ethnic division.108  Most notably, political organizing 
was banned until 1999.109  Although the motivation for these 
policies may have been justified given the highly politicized en-
vironment surrounding the genocide, the result was that many 
political freedoms were restricted, thus undermining the RPF 
ideology of public participation in political affairs.  
In April 2000, Paul Kagame, the Tutsi leader of the RPF, be-
came president when President Bizimungu resigned.110  Former 
President Bizimungu, who openly criticized his colleagues for 
being unnecessarily harsh on the opposition, was essentially 
forced to relinquish his post.111  The following year, he and for-
mer Minister Charles Ntakirutinka formed a new political 
party that was promptly declared illegal by the government.112  
In April 2001, Bizimungu was arrested and imprisoned for en-
gaging in illegal political activities and fostering ethnic divi-
sions.113 
  
 106. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, “CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY” IN POST-GENOCIDE 
RWANDA: EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS 3 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter ICG REPORT 1], at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report 
_archive/A400453_09102001.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).   
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 4. 
 109. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE RWANDA REPORT, supra note 82. 
 110. BBC News, Profile: Rwanda’s Strongman (Aug. 27, 2003) [hereinafter 
Rwanda Profile], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3170451.stm (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2005).  (Born in Rwanda, Paul Kagame grew up in Uganda and 
had been a soldier for most of his life.  In 1979, he joined the National Resis-
tance Army (NRA) in Uganda where he was a guerilla soldier before he was 
made head of military intelligence.  Kagame along with his friend, Fred Rwi-
gyema, helped establish the RPF.).   
 111. Id. 
 112. HUMAN RIGHTS RWANDA REPORT, supra note 101.  The political party, 
PDR-Ubuyanja, was declared illegal although there was no controlling law 
permitting the government to declare its illegality.  Id.   
 113. Id. 
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In November 2000, the National Electoral Commission 
(NEC)114 was formed to supervise the March 2001 district elec-
tions in which the Rwandan government’s decentralization pol-
icy115 would be put into practice.  The NEC, which was given 
considerable authority, is officially responsible for preparing, 
organizing and conducting elections, which includes establish-
ing district and provincial electoral commissions to prepare for 
elections at the local level.116  Its primary objective, however, is 
to ensure that elections are free and transparent.117  The 2001 
district elections were perceived as an important step in the 
transition process.118  Although there were very few reports of 
electoral misconduct, the tight political control exercised by the 
RPF over the elections prevented it from being a democratic 
process.119  International monitors observed that voters gener-
ally selected candidates whom they believed the influential 
members of the community would support.120  In addition, the 
NEC, which approved the final selection of candidates, used its 
power to veto candidates who did not support government poli-
cies.121  In spite of the doubts as to the existence of a real choice 
for Rwandan voters, the 2001 district elections were considered 
a substantial step towards democracy.122 
III. SOURCE OF OBLIGATION TO HOLD FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 
As discussed in the introduction, the international legal 
community has recognized an emerging right to democratic 
  
 114. The Arusha Peace Accords stipulated that an independent Electoral 
Commission had to guarantee the organization of free and fair elections.  
Arusha Protocol, supra note 94, art. 24(c). 
 115. Having identified an overly centralized state as one of the primary 
causes of the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government adopted a policy of 
“consensual democracy” in which the country was divided into districts that 
were to be run at the administrative level through collective decision-making.  
See ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 3–5. 
 116. National Electoral Commission, at http://www.comelena.gov.rw/index 
eng.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). 
 117. See RWANDA CONST. art. 180 (2003). 
 118. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at ii. 
 119. Id. at iii. 
 120. Id. at 19. 
 121. Id. at iii. 
 122. Id. at 20. 
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governance.123  Thomas Franck, the legal scholar who first in-
troduced this theory, argues that democratic entitlement has 
become an international norm.124  Therefore, countries seeking 
legitimacy internationally must conform to the norms of the 
international community.125  In order to conform to this norm, 
countries must govern with the consent of their citizens.126  This 
is especially important in countries emerging from transitional 
periods where validation by the international community is 
paramount.127   
According to Franck, self-determination, an internationally-
guaranteed human right, is the primary basis of democratic 
entitlement.128  Franck interprets the right to self-determination 
as the right of “peoples in all states to free, fair and open par-
ticipation in the democratic process of governance freely chosen 
by each state.”129  Democracy can be defined as involving three 
central rights: “the right to take part in government, the right 
to vote and be elected, and the right to equal access to public 
service.”130  Thus, free and fair elections are crucial elements of 
democratic governance.   
“Free and fair elections” is the general term used to describe 
the international standard for political participation in govern-
ance.131  The right to such elections, however, presupposes the 
existence of other human rights, such as freedoms of expres-
  
 123. Franck, supra note 5, at 46–47. 
 124. Id. at 47. 
 125. Id. at 48. 
 126. Id. at 46. 
 127. See OAS Charter, supra note 8 (“representative democracy is an indis-
pensable condition for [the] stability, peace and development….”).  See also 
Franck, supra note 5, at 50.  Franck also notes that election monitoring can be 
particularly useful where there is doubt as to the legitimacy of a regime.  Id. 
at 75. 
 128. Id. at 52. 
 129. Id. at 59 (Although the meaning of self-determination has different 
interpretations in international law, Franck interprets it as a peoples’ right to 
inclusion in their government’s politics rather than the right of a people to 
become an independent state). 
 130. Muna Ndulo, The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment 
in Africa, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 315, 334 (2003). 
 131. Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement: A Pro-
posal for United Nations Involvement in National Politics, 30 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 287, 294 (1997). 
File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc Created on:  6/8/2005 1:42 PM Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM 
1046 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:3 
 
sion, thought, assembly and association.132  Moreover, the hold-
ing of free and fair elections may not always be sufficient if the 
candidates are not truly committed to democracy.133  However, 
free and fair elections may serve as “evidence of consent to the 
process by which a populace is consulted by its government.”134  
Thus, free and fair elections legitimize governance. 
Evidence of the right to democratic governance can be found 
in both international customary law and treaties.  Because 
countries are required to conform their laws to their interna-
tional obligations, evidence of an obligation to hold free and fair 
elections can also be found in the domestic law of Nigeria and 
Rwanda. 
A. Customary International Law 
A basis for the right to democratic governance can be found in 
customary law.  Customary law results from the practice of 
states that are followed out of a sense of legal obligation, or 
opinio juris.135  As of 1991, more than 110 governments are le-
gally committed to permitting multi-party, secret ballot elec-
tions.136  Furthermore, as of 2003, more than three-quarters of 
African countries have adopted democratic systems of govern-
ance.137  The existence of a rule of customary international law 
is generally more difficult to confirm because it is not codified in 
a single binding document.  However, evidence of customary 
law can be found in the practice of states such as governmental 
acts and official statements of policy.138  Furthermore, treaties 
may also constitute evidence of customary law if they are widely 
accepted.139  
The UN has become increasingly involved in promoting de-
mocracy.  In 1993, the UN Security Council authorized member 
  
 132. See Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some Interna-
tional Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 449, 458 (1997), available at http:// 
www.ejil.org/journal/Vol8/No3/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law § 102(2), cmt. c [herein-
after Restatement].  
 136. Franck, supra note 5, at 47. 
 137. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 318. 
 138. Restatement, supra note 135, § 102 cmt. b. 
 139. Id. § 102(3).  
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states to use force to restore the democratic government in 
Haiti.140  Aside from this Security Council resolution, UN action 
has been primarily in the form of electoral assistance.  From 
1991 to 2001, the UN received requests for electoral assistance 
from no less than fifty-three countries, including Nigeria and 
Rwanda.141  These UN actions reflect the theory that democratic 
entitlement is an international norm.  UN General Assembly 
Resolutions also provide evidence supporting a legal right to 
democratic governance.  Although General Assembly Resolu-
tions are not binding, if passed with overwhelming support they 
may constitute strong evidence of customary law.   
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, 
was passed with overwhelming support in 1948.142  Although 
this resolution does not have the force of a treaty, over the years 
it has gained such esteem that it may constitute a customary 
rule of international law.143  It articulates a right to political 
participation and states “[t]he will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority for the government.”144  It further states 
“this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections 
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.”145  It also ar-
ticulates rights that are essential components of democratic 
entitlement, such as freedoms of opinion, expression,146 assem-
bly and association.147  
More recent resolutions reinforce the notion that a right to 
democratic governance exists and that free and fair elections 
are a necessary element of democracy.  In 1991, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Enhancing the Effec-
tiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections.”148  
This resolution was committed to enhancing the UN’s role in 
  
 140. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 336.   
 141. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine 
Elections: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex 1, 
Agenda Item 131(b), U.N. Doc. A/56/344 (2001). 
 142. See Franck, supra note 5, at 61. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. art. 19. 
 147. Id. art. 20. 
 148. See G.A. Res. 45, U.N. GAOR, 69th Plenary mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/45/150 (1990). 
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the electoral process, especially in countries seeking to 
strengthen their electoral systems.149  In 2001, a resolution 
called upon states to encourage democracy through the “devel-
opment of … an electoral system that ensures periodic, free and 
fair elections.”150  It further expressed its commitment to the 
“process of democratization of States.”151   
B. Treaties 
Additional evidence of the right to democratic governance can 
be found in treaties in which the right to political participation 
has been codified.  The terms of a treaty are legally binding on 
its signatories and the parties must implement and enforce do-
mestic laws to conform to their treaty obligations.152  Both 
Rwanda and Nigeria are signatories without qualifications to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)153 and the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (African Charter).154  Additionally, both are parties to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), however, only Nigeria is a signatory without 
reservation.155  All three treaties set forth provisions for civil 
and political freedom for all people.   
The ICCPR, one of the most important multilateral human 
rights treaties, was ratified in 1966.156  Nigeria became a party 
in 1993157 and Rwanda did so in 1975.158  The right to political 
  
 149. See id. ¶ 9. 
 150. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 55th 
Sess., 81st Plenary mtg. ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (2001). 
 151. Id. at 2. 
 152. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan. 27, 
1980, arts. 26–27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 338 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  
(Nigeria became a party on July 31, 1969 and Rwanda became a party on Jan. 
3, 1980.  Both are signatories without qualifications.). 
 153. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, art. 25(a), 999 U.N.T.S. 85, 273, 275 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 154. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 
art. 13, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 263, 266 [hereinafter African Charter]. 
 155. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 69 [hereinafter 
ICESCR]. 
 156. ICCPR, supra note 153, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171. 
 157. Id. at 273. 
 158. Id. at 172 n.1. 
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participation is evident in Article 25, which provides that all 
people have the right to take part in the conduct of public af-
fairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.159  The 
ICCPR further provides that there will be “genuine periodic 
elections” that demonstrate the “free expression of the will of 
the electors.”160  Thus, free and fair elections are an integral 
part of the right to political participation.  Furthermore, the 
ICCPR guarantees certain fundamental human rights, such as 
freedoms of thought,161 expression162 and association,163 which are 
the underpinnings of a free and fair election.  
The African Charter was ratified in 1981164 and both Nigeria 
and Rwanda became parties to it in 1983.165  The Charter is 
committed to the promotion and protection of people’s rights 
and freedoms, including civil and political rights.166  Evidence 
supporting a right to democratic governance can be found in 
Article 13, which states “every citizen shall have the right to 
participate freely in the government of his country, either di-
rectly or through freely chosen representatives.”167  Thus, citi-
zens have the right to vote and be elected.  Finally, the African 
Charter guarantees certain human rights whose existence are a 
necessary component of holding free and fair elections, such as 
freedoms of association168 and assembly.169   
Additionally, both Nigeria and Rwanda are parties to the 
ICESCR170 which states that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-
determination” and that “[b]y virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status.”171  While there is no specific 
provision articulating the right to political participation, accord-
ing to Franck’s interpretation, self-determination entails free, 
fair and open participation in the democratic process of govern-
  
 159. Id. at 179. 
 160. Id. art. 25(b). 
 161. Id. art. 18. 
 162. Id. art. 19(2). 
 163. Id. art. 22. 
 164. African Charter, supra note 154, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 217. 
 165. Id. at 245 n.1. 
 166. See id. at 246. 
 167. Id. at 248. 
 168. Id. art. 10. 
 169. Id. art. 11. 
 170. ICESCR, supra note 155, 993 U.N.T.S. at 172 n.1. 
 171. Id. at 173. 
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ance.172  Thus, the ICESCR can be read to support a right to 
democratic governance.   
C. Other Evidence 
Although Nigeria and Rwanda are not legally bound by trea-
ties to which they are not a party,173 the existence of other trea-
ties guaranteeing a right to political participation demonstrates 
that it is a widely accepted right.  The American Convention on 
Human Rights (American Convention) sets forth provisions 
guaranteeing the right to political participation.174  Article 23 
states that every citizen has the right to vote and be elected in 
genuine and periodic elections.175  This provision is similar to 
Article 25 of the ICCPR,176 which further substantiates the the-
ory that democratic governance is customary law.  Further-
more, fundamental human rights relating to political participa-
tion are also guaranteed, such as freedoms of thought, opin-
ion,177 association178 and assembly.179   
Additionally, the Protocol to the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Protocol) 
articulates a right to democratic governance.180  Article 3 states 
that parties shall hold “free elections…under conditions which 
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people….”181  
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this to 
mean that states are required to permit their citizens to par-
ticipate in free and open elections.182   
The existing customary law and treaty law make clear that 
democratic governance is, in fact, an international norm.  As an 
  
 172. Franck, supra note 5, at 52.  
 173. Restatement, supra note 135, § 102(3). 
 174. See American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force July 18, 
1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
 175. Id. at 151. 
 176. ICCPR, supra note 153, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179. 
 177. American Convention supra note 174, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 148–49. 
 178. Id. art. 16. 
 179. Id. art. 15. 
 180. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force May 18, 1954, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 
262, 264. 
 181. Id. at 264.   
 182. Franck, supra note 5, at 66. 
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international norm, states are obliged to conform to it.183  Fur-
thermore, the failure to conform to this norm constitutes a vio-
lation of international law.184  Thus, countries that hold elec-
tions in politically repressive atmospheres marked with elec-
toral fraud have failed to conform to this norm and have vio-
lated international law. 
IV. EVIDENCE OF THE FAILURE TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS  
As discussed above, there is evidence supporting the exis-
tence of an international obligation to hold free and fair elec-
tions.  While interpretations as to what constitutes free and fair 
may differ,185 it is clear that “elections cannot be merely used to 
lend authority to borderline authoritarian regimes.”186  Elections 
in which the party in power retains its power by manipulation, 
electoral fraud and intimidation clearly do not satisfy the crite-
ria of free and fair.  Furthermore, instances such as these vio-
late the right to democratic governance because the election 
results do not reflect the will of the people.   
The African Charter and the ICCPR, as discussed above, sup-
port the existence of a right to democratic governance.187  As 
signatories, Nigeria and Rwanda are obligated to conform their 
domestic laws to fulfill their treaty obligations.188  Furthermore, 
Article 26 of the African Charter states that parties have a 
“duty… to allow the establishment and improvement of appro-
priate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and 
protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present 
Charter.”189  This part of the Note will examine the political at-
mosphere surrounding the recent 2003 elections in Nigeria and 
Rwanda and discuss how these countries failed to fulfill their 
  
 183. See Restatement, supra note 135, at § 102 (noting that sources of a rule 
of international law can be “in the form of customary law, by international 
agreement or by derivation from general principles common to the major legal 
systems of the world.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Gassama, supra note 131, at 294. 
 186. Amy N. Lippincott, Note, Is Uganda’s “No Party” System Discrimina-
tory Against Women and a Violation of International Law?, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L 
L. 1137, 1153 (2000). 
 187. See supra Part III, B. 
 188. See African Charter, supra note 154, art. 1, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 246; 
ICCPR, supra note 153, art. 2(1–2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
 189. African Charter, supra note 154, art. 26, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 250. 
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international obligations to hold free and fair elections.  It will 
also examine some of the shortcomings of the national institu-
tions created to ensure that elections are free and fair. 
A. Nigeria 
The Nigerian government still reflects the ethnic division 
that has existed since the country achieved independence.  All 
of its military heads of state have come from the Hausa ethnic 
group, except for General Ironsi and General Obasanjo, the cur-
rent President of Nigeria.190  The Presidential lineups reflected 
the divisions along ethnic lines as they generally consisted of a 
Northerner with a Southern running mate or vice versa.191  Ad-
ditionally, the 2003 elections reflected the strong influence the 
military still has on Nigerian politics.  Not only was President 
Obasanjo’s main rival, General Buhari, a former military 
leader, two of the other candidates who ran for the presidency 
were also former members of the military.192   
1. 2003 Elections  
Many of the problems that have plagued Nigeria since its 
first attempt at civilian rule were reflected in the most recent 
April 2003 elections in which President Obasanjo of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP) was re-elected with sixty-two percent 
of the vote.193  The elections were marred by reports of numer-
ous cases of electoral fraud such as underage voting, multiple 
voting, stuffing ballot boxes, snatching of ballot boxes and falsi-
  
 190. Oko, Confronting Transgressions, supra note 12, at 117 n.158.  
 191. EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION, NIGERIA FINAL 
REPORT 9 (2003) [hereinafter EUEOM REPORT], at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/nigeria/rep03.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005).  
 192. Irin Web Special on Nigeria, supra note 61 (Maj-Gen. Ike Nwachukwu 
was a former foreign minister in a previous military government and Emeka 
Odumegwu-Ojukwu was a colonel in the Nigerian army who led the at-
tempted secession of the eastern region that resulted in the Biafra civil war in 
1967).   
 193. Lara Maupin, Lesson Plan, Nigeria Elections, NEWSHOUR EXTRA 
(2003), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/world/nig 
eria_4-23.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005). (President Obasanjo’s primary 
opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim former military leader, won thirty-
two percent).   
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fication of results.194  Election observers noted that the estab-
lished political parties, such as the PDP, were the parties pri-
marily involved in the electoral malpractice.195  In addition to 
the controversy surrounding the presidential elections, there 
were numerous challenges to the elections for state governor-
ship, senator, and legislative seats.196  This caused some to 
name the election 2003 “auction, selection or deception 2003.” 197 
2. Electoral Law 
The Electoral Law of 2002 sets forth numerous provisions 
governing the electoral process in Nigeria.198  However, the 2003 
elections reflect the inadequacy and inconsistency of many of its 
provisions.   
The Electoral Law does not provide an adequate mechanism 
for redressing abuses by the INEC and political parties because 
the only way to challenge an election or election results is by 
bringing an election petition before the appropriate Election 
Tribunal.199  However, only candidates or political parties may 
  
 194. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 37.  
 195. Id. at 42. 
 196. The Lagos State Election Tribunal dismissed Anthony Olufunso Wil-
liams’ petition challenging his opponent’s Bula Tinubu’s win and confirmed 
Tinubu as the governor of Lagos.  Innocent Anaba, Electoral Tribunal Con-
firms Tinubu’s Election, THE VANGUARD, June 3, 2003.  Collins Eselomo chal-
lenged the election of Solomon Funkekeme to the State House of assembly 
citing large-scale irregularities in the election result.  Tribunal Upholds Elec-
tion of Lawmaker, DAILY TRUST, Aug. 12, 2003.  The Delta State Election Tri-
bunal upheld the election noting that the petitioner did not want to pursue his 
case.  Id.  Willy Ezugwu challenged the Independent National Electoral 
Commission’s (INEC) declaration of Fidelis Okoro as the senator for Enugu 
North in the Enugu Election Tribunal. Tribunal Dismisses INEC’s Motion 
Against Proceedings, DAILY TRUST, Aug. 8, 2003. 
 197. Ahmadu Kurfi, The 2003 Elections and its Aftermath at 
http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/articles/2003_elections_and_its_aftermath.
htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). 
 198. See generally Electoral Law (2002) (Nig.). 
 199. Id. § 131(1).  The appropriate Election Tribunal for Presidential elec-
tions is the Court of Appeals; for all other elections petitions must be brought 
before the Election Tribunal established by the Electoral Law.  Id. § 131(2).   
See also § 134(1) (“[a]n election may be questioned on any of the following 
grounds…(b) that the election was invalid by reason of corrupt practice or non 
compliance with the provisions of this Act; (c) that the respondent was not 
duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election.”).  
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bring these petitions.200  Voters may file a complaint with the 
Public Complaints Commission, but this institution has no 
method of enforcing any of its findings.201  Thus, those who are 
most affected, the voters, do not have an adequate means of re-
dress.   
Section 36 of the Electoral Law provides that each party may 
have representatives at each polling station for which they have 
a candidate.202  However, there is no limit to the number of 
agents who may be present, which facilitated harassment of 
voters by party agents. For example, PDP Party agents were 
observed checking the ballots before putting them into ballot 
boxes.203  At another polling station, a PDP agent was observed 
specifically telling a voter to vote for General Obasanjo.204  
The Electoral Law does not provide a strict method for publi-
cation of election results. Section 61 has been interpreted as not 
requiring that results be posted publicly while votes are being 
counted.205  Thus, electoral officers simply declared the winners 
without issuing any public notice.206  However, the method of 
counting as well as the time it took raised doubts as to the va-
lidity of the results.207  Furthermore, election observers, as well 
as some political parties, were unable to obtain a breakdown of 
the results.208  The concerns of credibility were verified when 
election observers, after piecing together information, produced 
figures that were unrealistic given the actual number of regis-
tered voters compared to the number of votes counted.209  
3. INEC 
Although the INEC is primarily responsible for ensuring that 
elections are free and fair, it suffers from several structural and 
administrative defects that prevent it from fulfilling its respon-
sibilities.  In addition, the INEC’s dependence on the govern-
  
 200. Id. § 133(1)(a)–(b). 
 201. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 14.  
 202. Electoral Law § 36 (2002) (Nig.). 
 203. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 36 n.27. 
 204. Id. (The polling station was located in Bokkos, LGA.). 
 205. Id. at 31. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
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ment prevents it from operating as an independent institution.  
Given the INEC’s apparent acquiescence in the reported in-
stances of electoral fraud, it is clear that the INEC is not oper-
ating as the independent, unbiased, neutral entity that it was 
created to be.   
The basic structure of the INEC reflects its dependence on 
the government.  The INEC is composed of twelve commission-
ers and a chairman who are directly appointed by the President 
with the approval of the Council of State.210  The Resident Elec-
toral Commission (REC) administers INEC functions at the 
state level and each state office is headed by a Resident Elec-
toral Commissioner who is also directly appointed by the Presi-
dent but without the approval of Senate.211   
Furthermore, the INEC depends on the government for its 
funding.  The INEC’s budget must be approved before any 
funds are allocated.212  In addition, there appears to be no dis-
tinction between operational budgets and electoral budgets.213  
Thus, the provisions governing the appointment of electoral 
commissioners, as well as the lack of independent funding, do 
not adequately guarantee the independence of the INEC. 
The INEC, which is authorized to issue specific guidelines, 
failed to do so in areas that need the most regulation, such as 
campaign and political party financing.  The Electoral Law pro-
vides for a threshold of twenty Nairas in campaign expendi-
tures per registered voter.214  However, PDP party members 
were observed distributing hundreds of new bicycles to poten-
tial voters.215  In other areas, outright bribery of voters by PDP 
agents was observed.216  
Furthermore, the guidelines issued by the INEC were overly 
restrictive and, thus, prevented many political parties from reg-
istering.  In late 2002, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled that 
the guidelines were too restrictive and overturned them.217  As a 
  
 210. NIG. CONST. 3rd sched. § 6(a)(iv).  See also EUEOM REPORT, supra note 
191, at 17.  
 211. NIG. CONST. 3rd sched. § 14(2)(a). 
 212. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 18. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Electoral Law § 84 (2002) (Nig.).   
 215. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 27 n.16. 
 216. Id. at 34 n.23.   
 217. Id. at 13.  
File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc Created on:  6/8/2005 1:42 PM Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM 
1056 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:3 
 
result of this ruling, twenty-six parties registered for the elec-
tions.218  However, these parties did not have adequate time to 
prepare for the elections and consequently were at a disadvan-
tage to the incumbent political parties. 
The failure of the INEC to adhere to and interpret the elec-
toral law was a significant shortcoming in the 2003 elections.  
Furthermore, the flagrant disregard of electoral procedures by 
polling and party agents undermined the democratic foundation 
of the electoral process.  The Nigerian government has emerged 
from a long period of military rule in which democracy was 
nothing more than a facade.  While there have been substantial 
improvements since the return to civilian rule, elections marred 
by widespread patterns of electoral fraud such as these fail to 
meet the international criteria for free and fair elections.  Thus, 
Nigeria has failed to meet its international obligation to hold 
free and fair elections.   
B. Rwanda 
Since the RPF has been in power, the distinction between it 
and the government has become practically non-existent.219  As 
a result it has been able to enjoy a prominence in politics.  Part 
of the RPF’s power lies in the fact that it was the party that es-
sentially ended the genocide.220  As a result of this authority, 
challenges to the RPF are often viewed as challenges to na-
tional unity.  In fact, any political party that has attempted to 
challenge RPF power has been effectively silenced by accusa-
tions of promoting ethnic divisions, 221 creating an atmosphere of 
political repression.  While the desire to exert strict control over 
the political process is desirable given the tragic events of the 
  
 218. Id. 
 219. NAT’L DEM. INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, ASSESSMENT OF RWANDA’S PRE-
ELECTION POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES 4 
(Aug. 3–11, 2003) [hereinafter NDI REPORT], at http://www.access 
democracy.org/library/1642_rw_assessment_092203.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 
2005). 
 220. See Toby Manhire, What They Said About the Vote in Rwanda, THE 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2003 (“Mr. Kagame derives moral authority from the fact 
that he is the leader of the group that single-handedly stopped the genocide.”). 
 221. Article 33 of the Rwanda Constitution states “[p]ropagation of ethnic, 
regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable 
by law.”  RWANDA CONST. art. 33 (2003). 
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1994 genocide, “democracy depends on certain values, such as 
tolerance and trust….”222  Thus, in order for the process of de-
mocratization to fully take effect in Rwanda, the RPF must 
open the political arena to its opposition. 
1. 2003 Elections 
In August 2003, the first multi-party elections were held 
since the 1994 genocide.  Incumbent President Kagame won the 
presidency with approximately ninety-five percent of the vote.223  
Although the NEC proclaimed the elections free and fair, many 
election monitors and international observers were skeptical 
about the election results.224  European Union (EU) election 
monitors reported that President Kagame’s representatives 
controlled many of the voting stations and intimidated electoral 
officials and voters.225  At some polling stations the monitors 
claimed that they were simply denied access.226  The Amani Fo-
rum, another team of observers from the Great Lakes Region in 
Africa, reported that it was “difficult to say that the elections 
were free and fair.”227  
  
 222. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 341. 
 223. Although there are small discrepancies in the percentage of votes cast 
for President Kagame, it appears that 95% is the most accurate.  BBC News, 
Rwandan President Claims Landslide  (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Rwandan 
President], at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co. 
uk/1/hi/world/africa/3178611.stm (94%) (last visited Apr. 1, 2005); Arthur 
Asiimwe, Small Parties to Back RPF Again, ALL AFRICA, Sept. 3, 2003 (95%); 
Supreme Court Confirms Kagame’s Victory, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY 
(PANA) DAILY NEWSWIRE, Sept. 4, 2003 [hereinafter Kagame’s Victory] 
(95.05%). 
 224. Amnesty International issued a press release stating that the RPF 
continually harassed opposition supporters and engaged in unlawful tactics in 
order to silence the opposition or force members to join the RPF.  AMNESTY 
INT’L, PRESS RELEASE, RWANDA: RUN-UP TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MARRED 
BY THREATS AND HARASSMENT, (AI Index: AFR 47/010/2003) (Aug. 22, 2003) 
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE], available at http://web. 
amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470102003 (last visited Apr. 9, 2005); 
Grace Matsiko & Geoffrey Kamali, A Look at Kagame’s Landslide Win, ALL 
AFRICA, Sept. 3, 2003. 
 225. Matsiko & Kamali, supra note 224 (Colette Flesch was head of the 
European Union delegation that monitored the elections). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (The Amani Forum is made up of members of Parliament from the 
Great Lakes Region). 
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Faustin Twagiramungu,228 President Kagame’s primary oppo-
nent, petitioned the Supreme Court to nullify the election re-
sults.229  During the campaign, Twagiramungu was forced to run 
as an independent after his political party, Democratic Republi-
can Movement (MDR), was banned for allegedly promoting poli-
tics based on ethnicity.230  He claimed that the RPF engaged in 
intimidation tactics to pressure voters into voting for Kagame.231  
He also cited incidents of vote-rigging and violations of the elec-
toral law.232  On September 3, 2003 the Supreme Court upheld 
the results of the presidential elections.233  The Court dismissed 
Twagiramungu’s petition after ruling that his petition was not 
supported by material evidence.234  Although this may have been 
true, the fact that the President of the Supreme Court is an 
RPF member235 certainly raises doubts as to the impartiality of 
the Court’s ruling. 
2. Constitutional Violations  
In 2003, a new constitution was approved in Rwanda.  Article 
52 recognizes a multi-party system of government.236  Thus, the 
norm of democratic entitlement is reinforced by the notion that 
the people must consent to the way they are governed.  The rec-
ognition of a right to political freedom is also evident in Article 
33, which guarantees “freedom of thought, opinion, conscience 
  
 228. Twagiramungu was the former Prime Minister of the post-genocide 
government.  He resigned due to differences with the RPF and spent eight 
years in exile in Belgium.  Robert Walker, Profiles: Kagame’s Opponents, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2003), at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3174211.stm. 
 229. BBC NEWS, Rwanda Poll Challenge Rejected (Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Rwanda Poll] at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3201931.stm. 
 230. AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE, supra note 224. 
 231. Asiimwe, supra note 223; see also Rwanda Poll, supra note 229.  
 232. Asiimwe, supra note 223.  
 233. Rwanda Poll, supra note 229. 
 234. Kagame’s Victory, supra note 223. 
 235. In addition to Simeon Rwagasore, the President of the Supreme Court, 
the leaders of the judicial fora, both courts and tribunals, were RPF members.  
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY 
POLITICAL LIBERALISATION, App. E, (2002) [hereinafter ICG REPORT 2], at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400453_091020
01.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).  
 236. RWANDA CONST. art. 52 (2003). 
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and the public manifestation thereof.”237  The 2003 elections, 
however, reflect that the democratic process was undermined by 
the numerous violations of constitutional provisions. 
Under the Constitution, citizens are guaranteed the right to 
freedom of expression and opinion.238  The campaign period lead-
ing up to the election, however, was marred by allegations of 
“government-sponsored intimidation.”239  According to Amnesty 
International, the RPF has routinely used intimidation and vio-
lence against the opposition.240  One voter reported that when he 
attempted to vote for another candidate, an RPF supporter 
grabbed his ballot and told him “not to waste his time.”241  Inci-
dents such as this indicate that the government has not re-
spected this fundamental constitutional right.   
Article 53 of the Constitution provides that citizens are free 
to join or not join political organizations.242  During the cam-
paign period, the RPF reportedly used coercion to force people 
to attend its rallies.243  In addition, many opposition supporters 
were detained and released only after agreeing to announce 
their support for the RPF.244  The fact that six of the eight politi-
cal parties in Rwanda supported President Kagame245 lends cre-
dence to the allegation that the opposition was intimidated.  At 
the very least, it is strong evidence of the RPF’s control over the 
government.  
While freedom of association is guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion, this right, like others, may be limited to maintain national 
security.246  Consequently, this right remained suspended dur-
ing the entire transitional period.  When the law governing po-
  
 237. Id. art. 33. 
 238. Id.  
 239. High Turnout as People Vote in First Election Since Genocide, THE 
VANGUARD, Aug. 27, 2003.  See also Guy Selassie, Election 2003: Incumbent 
Wins Ballot, Loses Credibility in Rwandan Poll, WORLD MARKET ANALYSIS, 
Aug. 27, 2003. 
 240. AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE, supra note 224. 
 241. BBC News, Rwanda Poll Splits African Press (Aug. 28, 2003), at 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/af
rica/3187949.stm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).   
 242. RWANDA CONST. art. 53 (2003). 
 243. AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE, supra note 224. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Asiimwe, supra note 223. 
 246. RWANDA CONST. arts. 35, 43 (2003). 
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litical organizations was enacted on June 26, 2003,247 political 
parties and candidates had two months to organize and begin 
campaigning.  Political organizing, however, is still prohibited 
on the local level making it difficult for the opposition to garner 
support.248  The opposition could hardly compete with the unfair 
advantage that the RPF had, because the RPF was the only 
party permitted to function when political organizing was 
banned.   
In addition, it appears that the RPF enjoyed many advan-
tages that the opposition did not during the campaign period.  
Under the Electoral Law, media time is to be allocated equally 
among the candidates;249 however, reports indicate that the RPF 
was granted considerably more time on the airwaves.250  Al-
though the NEC president reported that the RPF was the only 
party that had held public rallies in nearly every province,251 
allegations that the RPF coerced people into attending its ral-
lies undermine this declaration of RPF popularity.252   
Although Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of 
press and information,253 the media is subject to many govern-
ment-imposed restrictions.  Members of the press who have 
criticized the government, particularly journalists, have con-
tinuously faced the threat of imprisonment, detention or exile.254  
The only licensed television and radio stations are owned by the 
government and, thus, subject to its control.255  The govern-
ment’s control over the media may be a result of rampant use of 
the airwaves to broadcast propaganda during the genocide.256  
  
 247. See Organic Law No. 16/2003 Governing Political Organizations and 
Politicians (2003) (Rwanda).    
 248. RWANDA CONST. art. 52 (2003); see also NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 
2, 4.  
 249. NDI REPORT, supra note 218, at 9. 
 250. Matsiko & Kamali, supra note 224. 
 251. NEC Sets Deadline for Submission of Candidate Representatives, 
RWANDA INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Aug. 8, 2003), at http://www.rwanda.net/ 
english/News/news082003/news08082003.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
 252. NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 4. 
 253. RWANDA CONST. art. 34 (2003). 
 254. AMNESTY INT’L, RWANDA REPORT 2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/ 
report2003/rwa-summary-eng (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
 255. NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 5. 
 256. See generally Metzl, supra note 100, at 628 (discussing how the radio 
was used to incite ethnic tension in Rwanda). 
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However, the fact that the RPF appeared to have unlimited ac-
cess to the media while it restricted the opposition’s access un-
dermined the justification for such strict control.   
According to the Organic Law Governing Political Organiza-
tions and Politicians, the assets of political organizations are to 
be derived from contributions from members, donations, lega-
cies, its property, activities or state grants.257  While it appeared 
that other political parties and candidates did not have many 
resources, the RPF reportedly gave gifts including livestock, t-
shirts and memorabilia at its rallies, leading to the conclusion 
that state resources were being used.258  Although there are no 
clear rules on the use of government resources for campaigning, 
Article 32 of the Constitution prohibits the embezzlement of 
public property.259  If state resources were used, this would be 
an unconstitutional use of government funds. 
3. NEC 
The NEC was created to ensure the presence of fair and free 
elections.260  There are several inherent problems, however, that 
prevent the NEC from being the independent, neutral institu-
tion it was intended to be.  The structure of the NEC renders it 
dependent on the RPF-controlled government, resulting in a 
strong connection between the government and the NEC.  In 
addition, the NEC has considerable discretion to interpret the 
electoral law, thus, its policies are very difficult to challenge.   
The NEC is composed of a Permanent Secretariat that in-
cludes an Executive Secretary and five Deputies who are nomi-
nated by the Prime Minister with the approval of Cabinet and 
the Council of Commissioners elected to serve on the NEC be-
fore and after elections.261  Because the government is controlled 
by the RPF, the Permanent Secretariat reflects this political 
makeup.  In addition, the confirmation of District Commission-
ers can only be made by the Permanent Secretariat which is 
  
 257. See Organic Law No. 16/2003 Governing Political Organizations and 
Politicians art. 21 (2003) (Rwanda). 
 258. NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 4. 
 259. RWANDA CONST. art. 32 (2003). 
 260. See id. art. 180. 
 261. See National Electoral Commission, supra note 116; ICG REPORT 1, 
supra note 106, at 12–13. 
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dominated by the RPF.262  Consequently, most electoral commis-
sioners are RPF supporters.  Thus, members of the government 
may effectively secure their jobs through their appointment of 
members of the NEC.  
Despite the NEC’s purported neutrality, there appears to be a 
strong connection between it and the RPF.  For example, in 
2002, the President of the Commission and the Executive Secre-
tary were notoriously powerful RPF members and their deci-
sions were often the decisive factor when choosing candidates 
for local electoral commissions.263  The current NEC president 
touted the fact that people were defecting from Twagiramungu’s 
camp at a press conference during the campaign period.264  This 
raised suspicions that he was acting as a campaign agent for 
the RPF.265  Given the connection between the NEC and the 
government, the NEC’s neutrality and independence is doubt-
ful.  
Another problem is that the NEC has considerable discretion 
in interpreting and defining the electoral law.  Article 45 of the 
Rwandan Constitution provides that all citizens have the right 
to participate in government, whether directly or through 
freely-chosen representatives.266  The Electoral Law provides all 
electoral candidates are required to be “persons of integrity,” 
yet the law does not provide a definition of integrity.267  Thus, 
what constitutes integrity is largely left to the discretion of the 
NEC, which allows the NEC to use this vague qualification as a 
pretext to prevent certain citizens from participating in gov-
ernment. 
In addition, the NEC has the authority to ban any political 
party that promotes politics based along ethnic lines, a violation 
under the Electoral Law and the Constitution.268  Art. 38 (1) of 
the Organic Law Governing Political Organizations and Politi-
  
 262. See National Electoral Commission, supra note 116; ICG REPORT 1, 
supra note 106, at 12. 
 263. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 12 (The former President of the 
Commission was Protais Musoni and the Executive Secretary was Christophe 
Bazivamo).   
 264. Matsiko & Kamali, supra note 224. 
 265. Id. 
 266. RWANDA CONST. art. 45 (2003). 
 267. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 14. 
 268. Id. at 16; RWANDA CONST. art. 54 (2003). 
File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc Created on: 6/8/2005 1:42 PM Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM 
2005] FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 1063 
 
cians provides that during the campaign period, every politician 
or political party is obliged to “avoid any speech, writing or any 
other kind of action based on discrimination or division.”269  Ar-
ticle 54 of the Constitution prohibits political organizations 
from basing themselves on race or ethnic groups.270  Since 2000, 
several parties have been exiled on the grounds that they were 
fostering ethnic divisionism; there appears, however, to be little 
or no evidence supporting these allegations.271  Many suspect 
that these accusations are a pretext to silence political oppo-
nents.272  
Although the Electoral Law provides for appeals to the Su-
preme Court, the NEC interpreted this to mean that the court 
provided a forum for allegations of “ballot manipulation” but 
not for challenges to NEC policies.273  Individuals may challenge 
NEC policy by first appealing to the district level, the provincial 
level, the NEC and then, finally, to the Supreme Court.274  As a 
result of this lengthy and burdensome process, few complaints 
are successful.275  Thus, any redress for an abuse of power by the 
NEC is subject to its own interpretation of the Electoral Law.  
The strict political control exercised by the RPF during the 
pre-election period suggests that the 2003 elections did not 
truly reflect the will of the people of Rwanda.  Furthermore, the 
repression of the opposition violated treaty obligations to ensure 
equal access to public service and freedom of association.276  
  
 269. Organic Law No. 16/2003 Governing Political Organizations and Politi-
cians art. 38(1) (2003) (Rwanda). 
 270. RWANDA CONST. art. 54 (2003). 
 271. As of 2003, approximately eleven political parties were in exile: Rwan-
dan Democratic Alliance (ADR); Alliance for Democracy and National Recon-
ciliation (ADRN IGIHANGO); Alliance for National Regeneration (ARENA); 
African Democratic Congress (CDA); Congres du Peuple (a party created from 
the split in the ARENA party); Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR); Resistance Forces for Democracy (FRD); Movement for 
Peace, Democracy and Development (MPDD); Monarchist Movement 
(NATION); Democratic Rally for the Return of Refugees (RDR); Union of 
Rwandan Democratic Forces (UFDR).  ICG REPORT 2, supra note 235, at 40–
41. 
 272. Profile: Rwanda’s Strongman, supra note 110. 
 273. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 14. 
 274. Id.  
 275. Id.  
 276. See e.g., African Charter, supra note 153, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; ICCPR, 
supra note 154, 999 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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Faced with the difficult task of rebuilding a nation after geno-
cide, the Rwandan government has embarked on a mission to 
build national unity and rid the country of the ethnic divisions 
that led to the horrific events of 1994.  Although Rwanda’s sys-
tem of consensual democracy is based on public participation in 
public affairs, in practice, this policy has been used to effec-
tively silence those who do not espouse RPF ideology.  By refus-
ing to let the opposition effectively compete, the government 
has undermined its attempt to hold free and fair elections. 
V. CONCLUSION:  THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE AND  
FAIR ELECTIONS 
As established above, there is an international norm of de-
mocratic governance.  Free and fair elections are an indispen-
sable element of democratic governance.  The most obvious 
benefit of holding free and fair elections is democracy.277  De-
mocratic elections are generally defined as elections that are 
fairly administered, grant equal voting rights to those who 
qualify to vote, and permit eligible voters to elect and be 
elected.278  These procedural guarantees ensure that an election 
is free and fair.279   
However, there are other benefits to be derived from holding 
free and fair elections.  One of those benefits is political legiti-
macy.280  Free and fair elections signify that results reflect the 
free expression of the will of the people.  Thus, those who are 
elected gain legitimacy.   Popular leaders would expect to do 
well in elections, but when such leaders participate in undemo-
cratic elections and are victorious, they lose legitimacy.281  Fur-
thermore, free and fair elections lead to international support.  
The emerging international norm of democratic governance 
mandates that only democracy can validate governance.282  
Thus, the international community is reluctant to support gov-
ernments that have come to power undemocratically.   
  
 277. Nhan T. Vu, The Nondemocratic Benefits of Elections, 28 CASE WEST. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (1996). 
 278. Id. at 454. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 455. 
 281. Id. at 459. 
 282. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 336. 
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Finally, by holding free and fair elections, countries reinforce 
their support for human rights.  Countries that are parties to 
human rights treaties have an obligation to enforce those 
rights.  Democratic governance presupposes the existence of 
fundamental human rights and free and fair elections demon-
strate that these rights have been exercised freely.   
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